In August 2016 the Ghanaian Parliament marked the advent of a new era for the country"s nascent petroleum industry with the enactment into law of the Petroleum (Exploration and Production) Act [Act 919]. Act 919 is considered to represent a major milestone in the legislative history of the upstream oil and gas industry in Ghana. The main objective of this article is to assess the new statute"s fitness for purpose through a critical examination of its regulatory aspirations and its underlying legislative presumptions. The discussion is set against the historical background of petroleum exploration and production in Ghana.
Introduction
On 4 th August 2016 the Ghanaian parliament marked the advent of a new era for the country"s nascent petroleum industry with the enactment into law of the Petroleum (Exploration and Production) Act, 2016 [Act 919 ]. Act 919 is considered to represent a major milestone in the legislative history of the upstream oil and gas industry in Ghana. The defining ethos of the new petroleum law is a strategic positioning of the oil and gas sector as the hub of the Ghanaian economy. This is with a view to ensuring for the sector the status of an engine or catalyst for economic growth. The main objective of this article is analyse the key provisions of the new law, and to reflect on the legislative background to the upstream petroleum industry in Ghana. The paper appraises the new statute"s fitness for purpose through a critical examination of its regulatory aspirations together with its legislative ambitions. The discussion is set against the historical background of petroleum exploration and production in Ghana.
Act 919 overlays a substantial corpus juris of legislative enactments which together make up the legal framework governing the upstream petroleum industry in Ghana. As such, it could be argued to be in effect a consolidating statute. Evidence of this can be found in its many overlapping provisions, replicating as it does some aspects of the Ghana Model Petroleum Agreement (MPA) of 2000, together with aspects of the fiscal regime contained in previous legislation and fiscal instruments. Overlapping provisions in the overall legal framework have, inevitably, led to some inconsistencies. Also identified in the concluding sections of this paper are a number of obsolete provisions from previous legislation and instruments. The final part of the article outlines a number of recommendations, including the need to streamline the legislative framework as a whole with a view to reconciling inconsistent provisions and excising redundant references from current texts.
Historical Overview of the Petroleum Industry in Ghana
Better known for its gold mining and cocoa industries, Ghana is a relatively newcomer to the international petroleum scene. However, the history of oil exploration and prospecting in Ghana stretches back to 1896. A review of the petroleum industry in Ghana reveals four main historical phases as follows:
The period from 1972-1979 witnessed the intensification of exploration efforts with the drilling 17 wells, 15 of which were offshore. However, the only significant discovery was the Saltpond Oil Field which came on-stream in 1978 following the initial discovery by Signal/Amoco Group in 1970. On the whole, the exploration effort during this phase remained rudimentary. The datasets were poor and it is likely that some onshore wells such as
Takoradi 11-1 were possibly drilled off-structure. The Ghana National Petroleum Corporation (GNPC) was established in 1983 to provide the institutional framework for upstream petroleum operations in Ghana. It was the statutory product of PNDC 64. Section 2 outlines the "Objects" of the GNPC. These include undertaking petroleum exploration, development, production and the disposal of petroleum products. The corporation is also tasked with ensuring the maximisation of benefits to the nation from petroleum resources, 7 including technology transfer, capacity building, the training of nationals in the acquisition of petroleum industry skills and technical expertise, 8 and sound environmental practices in petroleum development. 9 As part of its mandate, the GNPC is to engage in petroleum operations and enter into association agreements for 5 Ibid, p.3. 6 See further A.J. Banful, "Ghana"s Present Legal Framework for Upstream Petroleum Production", in K.
Appiah-Adu (Ed.), Governance of the Petroleum Sector in an Emerging
Developing Economy (2013) ; pp.145-162; Gower Publishing. ISBN 798-1-3155-8550-5. 7 Section 2(2)(b) of PNDC 64. 8 Section 2(2)(c) and (d). 9 Section 2(2)(e).
petroleum development including exploration, production, storage and transportation of petroleum products. 10 Article 2.4 of the Ghana Model Petroleum Agreement (MPA) provides for a minimum of 10% initial carried interest in all petroleum agreements (GNPC"s participating interest in fields currently under production such as the TEN oilfield is 15%). Holding Fund (PHF). 13 They are assisted in this function by the Investment Advisory
Committee.
14 One of the main features of Act 815 is the establishment of the Ghana Stabilisation Fund (GSF) which functions as a holding account for excess revenue in periods of high oil prices. The objective of the fund is to utilise the excess revenue to stabilise public expenditure in a low oil price market. 15 The other major contribution of the Act is the establishment of the Ghana Heritage Fund (GHF) 16 whose objective is to provide an endowment, through savings and investments, aimed at promoting long term development goals for future generations. Both the GSF and the GHF are funded through allocations from the PHF. 17 Act 815 aspires to ensure the efficient, diligent and judicious utilisation of petroleum revenues for the benefit of all Ghanaian citizens. The guiding principles of Act 815
can thus be said to include government responsibility and accountability for revenues generated from petroleum development, transparency, sustainability, and inter-generational equity as evidenced by the establishment of the GHF. It is hoped that these remedial measures should in the long term address the acknowledged deficiencies which in the past have stalled the growth of the Ghanaian petroleum funds. Initially set at US$ 250 million at its inception, the threshold minimum amount for the stabilisation fund was reduced to US$ 150 million in 2015 and currently stands at US$ 100 million. 18 It may well take another period of sustained growth in oil prices for the funds to be replenished.
As the government embarked on these legislative and regulatory initiatives, developments were also taking place further afield with the modernisation of exploration Participating interests in the field are as follows: Tallow (35.48%), Kosmos (24.08%), Anadarko (24.08%), GNPC (13.64%) and Petro SA (2.72%). 21 Daily production from the field in 2015 was 102,600 bpd. 22 It is expected that this production figure will be boosted following approval of Tullow"s Greater Jubilee Full Field Development Plan.
The Jubilee Oilfield currently occupies the prime position as the jewel in crown of Ghana"s nascent petroleum industry. In second place is the TEN (Tweneboa, Enyenra and Ntomme) Oilfield discovery which is located offshore, and west of Jubilee. With Tallow Oil as the operator, when fully developed TEN is expected to yield 76,000 bpd. The field forms part of Ghana"s strategy to double its current oil production by the year 2021. 23 It is worth noting that in 2012 petroleum displaced cocoa as the second export income earner for Ghana after gold. 24 With increasing production, there is a good prospect that oil could one day become the primary export earner, furnishing the income generation and thus the catalyst for economic growth.
There have not been any significant onshore discoveries to date. However, following a 40-year hiatus, a major onshore exploration programme (the Voltaian Basin Project (VBP)), 19 However, it is important to point out that despite strident opposition in some quarters, many commentators have welcomed the enactment of the new Act.
32 As seen above, Article 2.4 of MPA provides that GNPC shall have a 10% initial interest in all petroleum operations on a carried interest basis. Under current petroleum agreements such as the "TEN; project, the GNPC"s participating interest is 15% (supra, note 11). 33 http://www.resourcegovernance.org/blog/ghanas-petroleum-exploration-and-production-bill-steps-forwardroom-improvement; accessed on 2 December 2016. 34 Ibid.
The advent of the new legislation has given rise to official and public optimism founded on the hope that the new Act will presage the advent of a new era for the petroleum industry in Ghana -with the upstream petroleum sector serving as a springboard for economic growth and the catalyst for the transition to an emerging economy. Act 919
replicates some of the provisions of the MPA which govern the contractual and legal regime, as well as some of the fiscal provisions contained in earlier legislation and instruments which preceded the Act. This overlapping has given rise to some inconsistent provisions which will be highlighted as part of the discussion in a latter section of this paper. 
Key principles and defining philosophy of Act 919
The stated objective of Act 919 is to provide a robust legal and regulatory framework capable of meeting the challenges posed by the advent of a new era in the upstream petroleum industry in Ghana -to wit, the era of commercial production. Key amongst these challenges are financial and environmental factors, as well as deriving optimum benefits for the Ghanaian economy through local participation in upstream activities. The Act also seeks to ensure the maximum utilisation of local content/ materials in petroleum exploration and development activities. The guiding philosophy of Act 919 is thus to ensure the safe, secure, sustainable and efficient development of oil and gas resources, with the aim of achieving optimal long-term exploitation of deposits. 36 The ultimate aspiration of the Act is the use of 35 These parts have headings but are not numbered in the Act. The author"s numbering here is done for the purposes of analytical convenience. 36 Section 2: "Object of the Act".
petroleum revenues for the benefit and welfare of Ghanaian citizens, and for the advancement of inter-generational equity.
The key principles informing the conception and the ethos of Act 919 can be identified as follows:
 Sustainability: through the sound, efficient and secure management and exploitation of oil and gas resources, together with the avoidance of waste 37 , in order to ensure long term recovery of deposits in line with international best practice. Concerning the principle of efficiency, the Act mandates the coordination of petroleum development activities and the implementation of unitisation programmes where petroleum deposits straddle the common boundary of contract areas or blocks. This is with a view to ensuring optimum recovery through single unit operations from the common basin. 38 The Act also legislates a minimum work obligation requirement during the exploration period, together with a corresponding minimum expenditure amount during each working period of the exploration phase. 39 The financial penalty for failure to comply with the minimum work requirement is payment by the Contractor to the GNPC of a sum equivalent to the amount required to complete the unfulfilled portion of the work programme for the relevant working period. subsidiary in the form of a joint venture company, with at least 5% participation by an indigenous Ghanaian company. 45 However, the JV Guidelines prescribe a minimum of 10% participation for indigenous companies.
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The Ghana Petroleum Holding Funds and the Ghana Petroleum Funds concepts (which preceded Act 919) are equally informed by the need to promote good governance and generational equity in the management of petroleum resources. 47 The principle of transparency, on the other hand, requires the Petroleum Commission to establish and maintain a public register of all petroleum agreements, licences, permits and authorisations. https://www.chathamhouse.org/publication/oil-gas-good-governance-guidelines-2015; accessed on 14 December 2016. Although seemingly vague at first sight, Precept 3 needs to be read in conjunction with other complementary provisions which incorporate the ethos of these benchmarks, as well as other ethical aspects and values considered as pre-requisites for good oil industry practice. 56 Sections 5 and 11. 57 Section 9(5). 58 Section 9(7-8).
Section 10-20 contain provisions governing the petroleum agreement, whose normal duration is 25 years. 59 The under an obligation to adopt techniques and strategies aimed at optimising petroleum recovery, including the avoidance of waste or untimely depletion through loss of reservoir energy. In line with these obligations, the Contractor is required to submit to the Minister a plan outlining the proposed development programme prior to commencing production operations. 75 The plan, to which an approved environmental report should be appended, covers a wide range of operational matters including, inter alia: information on commerciality and proven reserves; technical and safety factors; geological parameters and reservoir engineering methodology; proposed drilling and completion plans; financing plan; long term production schedule; fiscal metering systems, and local content plans. The relationship between the licensing system and the JV agreement lies in the fact that the latter provides a vehicle for the actualisation of a key licensing condition, which is the putting in place of the PSC component of the hybrid system in the event of a successful bid. But as the name suggests, the JV guidelines are in effect a form of non-binding "soft law"
which are intended to complement the legally binding framework. As stated in its Article 10, the provisions are intended to "guide" upstream industry operators on the formation, structure and activities of JV companies. The main aspiration of the JV guidelines is to create an enabling environment for effective indigenous participation in petroleum operations, thus enhancing "local content" in the upstream industry. In view of its legal status as a "guide", the unavoidable conclusion would be that in the event of a conflict between its provisions and those of a legally binding instrument such as the 2013 Regulations (an addendum to Act 821), the provisions of latter would take precedence over the guidelines. Such would the case therefore, with some of the inconsistencies (identified as part of this discourse) between the JV Guidelines and legally binding statutory instruments.
Provisions relating to the fiscal regime
Act 919 confers a statutory status on the pre-existing fiscal regime for the upstream petroleum industry in Ghana. It enacts into law the previous regime whose chief hallmarks were flexibility and negotiation, rather than rigid legislative prescriptions. The main components of the fiscal regime comprise of petroleum royalties, petroleum income tax, capital gains tax, participating interest and bonus payments. 81 Sections 85-89 of the Act, which govern the fiscal regime, are in effect consolidating measures which affirm the fiscal arrangements contained in previous legal instruments. Most notable amongst these are the
Petroleum Income Tax Act, 1987 [PNDC 188] and the Petroleum Commission (Fees and Charges) Regulations, 2015 [L.I. 2221].
The royalty rate, representing a percentage of gross volume of petroleum production, is not fixed (unlike the mining sector which has had a fixed rate of 5% since 2010). For the upstream petroleum sector royalty payments range from 4% -12.5% for oil production, and 3% -10% for gas production. 82 A specific royalty rate is negotiated between the Contractor and the State party for each petroleum agreement. It could be argued that this approach represents a double-edged sword; while it provides flexibility in pre-contract negotiations, 81 See generally, F.M. Sasraku, "Petroleum Economics -Ghana"s Petroleum Tax Regime and its Strategic Implications", in K. Appiah-Adu (Ed.), supra, note 6, 163-174. 82 Article 10.1 of MPA prescribes a royalty rate of 12.5%. See also J. Amoaka-Tuffour and J. Owusu-Ayim, "An Evaluation of Ghana"s Petroleum Fiscal Regime", 4 Ghana Policy Journal (2010), 7-34.
there is nonetheless an inherent degree of uncertainty as to the precise fiscal obligations of the Contractor prior to the conclusion of the petroleum agreement. 
Other noteworthy provisions of Act 919.
It is beyond the remit of this article to examine all the provisions of the new Act. In concluding this part of the discourse, it is therefore proposed to summarise some of the main In the next section, the nature of the hybrid petroleum regime will be examined, together with its historical background influences, rationale and key features.
4. The Ghana royalty Hybrid Petroleum Regime: influences, rationale and main features.
The pre-Act 919 legal framework for petroleum exploration and production in Ghana, put in place by PNDC 84, was an essentially contractual regime based on two elements:
royalty payments, and production sharing. The new hybrid regime under Act 919 adds to the old regime a new feature, a pre-contractual bidding system. This brings to the new regime an administrative licensing component which in effect serves the function of pre-qualification for the second phase, which comprises of a contractually negotiated PSA.
4.1. Background to the hybrid regime: twin influences of administrative licensing/ permits and the contractual regime.
The administrative permit licensing system for petroleum or mineral development is closely associated with the concessionary regime, with its roots in the French civil law concept of the contrat adminsitratif. 92 Petroleum exploration and production rights under the permit or licensing system, being in the nature of an administrative grant, are subject to the "clauses exhorbitantes de droit commun". 93 Under this concept, the petroleum permit or licence is in effect a public law instrument, and is thus in principle subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of national law (including the municipal competences of domestic courts) in the event of a dispute between the between the IOC and the host State. As Riad points out, "… the public power is omnipresent and constitutes a predominant factor … this reality is clearly reflected in the French terminology of "convention d'etablissement"".
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Compared with the PSC regime which seeks to regulate the legal and fiscal, as well as the commercial aspects of the petroleum development project, the administrative licensing or permit regime has a more limited scope which incorporates the legal and fiscal elements, but b) From a legal perspective, the PSC serves the function of a contractual vehicle for the JV partnership between the State party (SOE) and the IOC. It is to be observed in this regard that the JV model used for the upstream petroleum industry in Ghana is a combination of "carried interest" (contractual) and "sole risk account" (equity) joint venture. 97 The sole risk account of Ghana"s SOE (GNPC) is activated when the contractor (IOC) declines to pursue an interest in a particular oil project which the GNPC wishes to embark on. c) From an economic perspective, the PSC is intended to maximise host state benefits through its share of oil production from the joint venture, an additional benefit not available under a royalty and tax-based concession, licensing or permit system.
At first sight the PSC appears to be a basic partnership or production sharing arrangement between the host State and a private sector company. However, as argued by
Bindeman, in its operational aspects it is often a highly complex legal relationship, incorporating components such a risk-reward allocation mechanisms, principal-agent relationships, and even what may be regarded as elements of sharecropping. 98 The acquisition of contractual or equity interests by the host State is often in exchange for contractually negotiated incentives offered to the IOC investor. 99 These may include internationalisation of the dispute settlement mechanism through choice of forum and applicable law provisions 100 , as well as the inclusion of stabilisation clauses. 101 From a
Rationale for the Hybrid System
Bespoke hybrid petroleum regimes are representative of efforts by oil producers to manage some of the inherent tensions and potential conflicts associated with the design of upstream petroleum projects. As observed by Tordo, despite the common goal of generating high levels of income which is the shared aspiration both host States and IOCs, there is often a misalignment of objectives between the two parties. This is because host States tend to aim for a maximisation of rental income and the pursuit of other socio-economic goals, including long term sustainability in the exploitation of finite resources. 102 The IOCs" main aim, on the other hand, is to ensure an appropriate return on investment commensurate with projectassociated risks and other strategic commercial objectives. However, project revenues under a licensing/ permit based system usually tend to fall short of satisfying the host country"s aspirations. It is for this reason that novel and innovative forms of contractual, fiscal and institutional arrangements have been sought by countries for upstream petroleum development, hence the emergence of hybrid petroleum regimes. 103 Considering the foundational principles and ethos of Act 919, it could be argued that the statute places Ghana"s petroleum regime within the group of countries seeking such innovative arrangements. In the case of Ghana"s hybrid system, a combination of licensing and production sharing ensures that the publicity surrounding the initial bidding process attracts a wider audience of potential bidders through a transparent process than would be the case with a purely contract-based system founded on discreet (individual) enquires or private negotiations. It also ensures the maximisation of revenues through associated fees and charges in the licensing round. 104 In the case of Ghana, the PSC-JV agreements complement the licensing process with a contractual component. This ostensibly introduces to the hybrid regime a greater degree of efficacy and robustness -with State control exercised through the licensing system, while the contractual phase ensures for the IOC partner an effective contribution to project design through negotiated terms and conditions.
The increasing diversity of petroleum regimes worldwide, coupled with the necessity for each country to tailor its legal framework for petroleum exploration and production to suit its particular geological conditions, political circumstances and economic strategy, provides a sound rationale for a bespoke Ghanaian model with its emphasis on accountability, transparency and participation by indigenous enterprises in upstream petroleum activities through the JV platform. However, the Ghanaian approach is not without its associated risks.
For whereas the hybrid system may afford Ghana income generation opportunities on a number of fronts (royalties, acreage fees, AOE, etc.), it also exposes Ghanaian petroleum agreements to the twin risks of both fiscal and contractual instability; it may also lead to a weakening of bargaining power in any ensuing contractual negotiations following a relatively poor or failed licensing/ bidding round. It is perhaps by dint of these multiple risks that internationally, the hybrid system and its variants continue to lag behind the number of concession agreement, PSCs, and JVAs as the preferred form of oil regime. There is therefore an argument to be made for a more institutionalised approach which would remove the mandate of direct negotiations (devoid of licensing) from the office of the Minister and place it under the remit of a relevant institution such as the Ghana Petroleum
Commission, complemented by parliamentary oversight.
The new petroleum regime of Ghana can more appropriately be described as a "hybrid system with special provisions for natural gas". 107 This is in view of the stipulations contained in Section 32 of Act 919 and Article 14 of MPA regarding the production and disposal of associated natural gas. Other variants of the hybrid regime used in countries such as Angola, Bangladesh and Nigeria do not include specific obligations relating to the production and disposal of associated natural gas, leading to the practice of natural gas flaring and its associated environmental problems.
A Comparative Perspective
Under the current system, the State-owned GNPC plays a pivotal role as the local JV barrels") utilising the PSC platform. Under the Chinese system exclusive rights to exploration and production were assigned to the local Chinese partner, with the IOC in the role of contractor -in effect a risk service contract with payment to the contract in cash or kind.
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On closer examination, Ghana"s hybrid system can be said to differ from the Chinese model.
Under the Ghanaian regime, although title to oil and gas in situ is vested in the State, Article 10.1 MPA provides for produced crude oil to be distributed amongst the parties in line with their "participating interests" -hence ruling out a risk service contract model.
Allocation of Production under the Ghana Hybrid Regime.
By combining references to participating oil (contractual) with provisions on equity Flexibility seems to be the hallmark not only of Act 919, but of the Ghanaian legal framework as a whole. This evidenced in particular in the flexible approach to fiscal terms (royalty rate, taxation), and in provisions relating to GNPC"s participating interests. All of these aspects are outlined in legislation only in generic terms, with the specific details left to the negotiated terms of each petroleum agreement. This flexibility does have its advantages.
However, it could also be to the detriment of clarity, predictability and certainty. It could even be argued that the approach falls short of the principles of international best practice, to which Ghana aspires. In line with international best practice, On the positive side, it could be argued that the legislative framework as a whole provides a viable platform for Ghana"s nascent petroleum industry. A key concern has now been addressed though the reassignment of the putative regulatory role previously earmarked for the GNPC, which had raised questions of a potential conflict vis-à-vis its role as regulatory and participant. The regulatory role now comes under the remit of the Ghana Petroleum Commission. There are also been a great deal of disenchantment and criticism amongst civil society organisations in Ghana concerning the hybrid system, together with a seeming preference for the PSA form of agreement. However, it could be argued that the PSA, or any other form of agreement, does not per se guarantee the success of a petroleum regime. Rather, it is the substantive provisions of the particular agreement, combined with the judicious and conscientious management of oil revenues, which hold the key to a successful oil economy. Substance, rather than form, should be the overriding concern. At this relatively early stage in its development, the hybrid system could well provide the required scope for attracting FDI into Ghana"s upstream petroleum industry. The PSA could be a model to consider when Ghana attains a higher level of production, together with enhanced bargaining power.
6. Optimism underneath the Ever-present Shadow of the Resource Curse Thesis?
Ghanaians live with the knowledge that their newly found wealth could in the long term turn out to be either a blessing, or a curse. There has already been a great deal of soulsearching discourse on the susceptibility of Ghana"s oil and mineral economy to the resource curse thesis, 113 or its counterpart, the "Dutch disease". Such discourse has included the identification of possible strategies for avoiding the syndrome. 114 The resource curse thesis itself, which seek to diagnose, explain and understand the paradox of "poverty in the midst of plenty" (i.e. why some countries with an abundance of renewable natural resources tend to experience poor economic growth and resource-based conflict) has been widely hypothesised in economic literature. 115 However, there are dissenting scholars who, in the absence of irrefutable proof or compelling evidence, are not convinced about the existence or presence of the resource curse as a factual in explaining poor economic performance. 116 As a hypothesis, the thesis nonetheless provides a persuasive paradigm for understanding the contradiction of intractable conflicts and dire economic situations of many developing countries which are endowed with abundant natural resources. Furthermore, this counterintuitive process of growth in resource-rich countries has to some extent been supported by empirical studies conducted by Sachs and Warner, whose findings revealed a strong correlation between abundant natural resources endowment and poor economic growth. 117 From the perspective of Ghana and its newly found oil wealth, interest in the resource curse thesis should lie not so much in its foreboding, as in seeking to fully understand its causes, symptoms and manifestations. This requires learning from the economic literature and drawing lessons from the revealing experiences of other countries. This process of informed engagement and acute awareness should permit Ghana to gradually formulate adequate responses and policies which, in the long term, can be effective in shielding the country from the debilitating effects of the resource curse syndrome. 118 As for the perceived causes, the first sign to watch out for is conflict between the State and foreign oil contractors or multinational corporations over control and management of resources. At the macro-economic level, an over-reliance or extreme dependence on resource revenues should be avoided. This is in view of the volatility and vicissitudes of global oil markets. Equally to be monitored, and controlled, is a policy of over-reliance on imported goods and services -which can have economically debilitating impacts. A sustainable policy of diversification of the economic base, and capacity building of human resources, is required to counter a tendency towards oil dependency. Rather worryingly for Ghana, a low savings rate (one of the chief symptoms of the resource curse hypothesis) is already being experienced despite its new found oil wealth. This is evidenced in the systematic drawdowns which are becoming a familiar feature of the operation of the funds. This symptom, together with its underlying cause, will need addressing as a matter of urgency.
The most virulent symptoms of the resource curse syndrome manifest themselves in the form of endemic political corruption, entrenched economic deprivation of the masses and environmental degradation. 119 This is often accompanied by poor governance, democratic disenfranchisement and political instability -leading to increasingly authoritarian and dictatorial tendencies on the part of the governing class. 120 The consequences, as in the Democratic Republic of Congo and in Nigeria, can be resource conflict in the form of civil or sectarian armed violence. This in turn could ultimately lead to a breakdown in law and order, collapse of national institutions, and an erosion of state authority -to wit, a failed state. 121 Policies aimed at increasing average incomes, and providing economic opportunities for all sections of Ghanaian society, thus provide the key to unlocking the illogical puzzle posed by the conundrum which represents the paradox of "poverty in the midst of plenty".
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The principles of good governance, accountability and transparency, which have all been embedded in Act 919, provide a good foundation for addressing some of the causes of the hypothesis. Democratic institutions and processes will need to be further strengthened.
Critical to this process will be the role of civil society organisations and NGOs particularly in ensuring accountability, transparency and dispute resolution vis-à-vis environmental or other resources-related conflicts.
Ghana is endowed with seemingly favourable geological prospects. 123 However, the exploration history to date is yet to live up to industry expectations of a prolific oil producing province. New discoveries such as the Jubilee oilfield could well signal a turn-around in Ghana"s fortunes. Act 919 heralds a future filled with much hope and promise, but also with potential pitfalls and dangers, amongst which are the revenue instability caused by oil price fluctuations. There also seems to be an expectation, or presumption, on the part of officials that the advent of Act 919 will automatically lead to an inflow of FDI into the oil sector.
Further progress on the exploration and production front will thus depend on substantial investments, not just from small or medium sized companies, but also from some of the major oil multinationals.
Whether or not the country will one day be able to match the production capacity of some of the more established oil producers in the region such as the Republic of Congo (239,000 bpd), Gabon (240,000 bpd) and Equatorial Guinea 242,000 bpd) -or even major producers such as Angola (1.7 million bpd) and Nigeria (2.4 million bpd) 124 -remains to be seen. What is certain is that an enabling legal environment, together with an efficient and judicious regulatory framework, will continue to play a pivotal role in promoting economically sound and environmentally sustainable petroleum development. Informing this process will be lessons drawn from mature oil provinces and international best practices.
Ghana"s optimism is neither ill-conceived nor misplaced. Its policy makers and citizens have every reason to nurture positive hopes and expectations from increased oil production. Given the right policies, Ghana has good prospects of emerging from underneath the shadow of the oil curse syndrome. In this regard, the country can perhaps draw some measure of comfort (but devoid of complacency) from the knowledge that the resource curse 122 Cf. 126 Like a parasitic infection, it requires an acquiescent and compliant host country with an accommodating environment defined by permissive conditions. The first step towards combating the scourge will be an awareness (and acceptance) of its existence, followed by the formulation and implementation of effective avoidance strategies. Ghana has the added advantage of its own experiences from the gold mining industry, from which it can draw historic lessons.
Conclusion
Act 919 is in essence a consolidating statute. Most of the principles it encapsulates are concepts which had already been enshrined in previous legislative and regulatory instruments, or otherwise existed in contracting and licensing practice (as is the case with the hybrid system which pre-dates the Act). It could thus be argued that the importance of Act 919 lies more in its historical significance -coming as it does at a particularly defining moment in the history of Ghanaian oil production -than in any substantive contribution which it has brought to the legal framework for upstream petroleum sector governance.
The most pertinent challenge facing Ghana and its nascent oil industry is clearly that of defying the odds, and reversing the regional trend, by confounding the resource curse syndrome which has become such an endemic feature of natural resources endowment in Sub-Saharan Africa. For therein lies the true test of success as an emerging oil economy. Will Ghana finally emerge from underneath the ominous shadow of this historical syndrome?
Overcoming this challenge will require effective implementation of the key principles of sustainability, good governance and utilization of oil revenues for the benefit of all Ghanaians, which are all embedded in the current legal framework. A robust, effective and efficient legal, regulatory and institutional framework is undoubtedly a fundamental requirement in this regard. Act 919 thus now needs to be transformed from a static into a living document -to wit, one that is responsive to every new challenge and to the changing 
